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WHAT'S YOUR FAVOURITE RIGHT?
THE CHARTER AND INCOME MAINTENANCE
LEGISLATION
Reuben Hasson*
In the years following the enactment of the Charter, demands have
been made by various commentators that the Charter be used to im-
prove legal aid, l welfare rates2 homelessness, 3 education,4 and indeed,
virtually any social problem that anyone can think of.5
In asking the courts to undertake this agenda, the proponents seem to
be unaware that no judiciary anywhere in the world has undertaken
such a task. If this is so, one must ask why these demands are being
made.
* Copyright * 1989 Reuben Hasson. Reuben Hasson is a professor of law at Os-
goode Hall Law School.
I am greatly indebted to my research assistant, Ms. Jamie Mason (O.H.L.S. Class of
'91) for her extraordinary wisdom, humour and insight. I am also indebted to my
colleagues Harry Glasbeck and Judy Fudge who not only read the paper, but who
have furthered my education in the Charter over the last five years.
1. See Mary Jane Mossman, "The Charter and Legal Aid" (1985) 1 J. L. & Social
Pol'y 21.
2. See Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter and Constitutionally Protected
Welfare" (1988) 46 U. of T. Fac. Law Rev. 1.
3. Linda Gehrke, "The Charter and Publicly Assisted Housing" (1985) 1 J. L &
Social Pol'y 17; J. Adams et al. "Homelessness and the Right to Shelter" (1988)
4 J. L. & Social Pol'y 35 at 80-93 (a study by Parkdale Community Legal Ser-
vices).
4. See K. Ruff, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Tool For So-
cial Justice?" in (1988-9) 13(2) Perception 19.
5. See Ruff, ibid; see also Martha Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights
Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. R. 257. For more balanced accounts of
the Charters potential in the income maintenance area, see S. Wain, "The Im-
pact of the Charter of Rights on Social Assistance" (background paper
prepared for the Ontario Social Assistance Review Commmittee, 1987)
Imimeol; Ian Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person in Need: Sec-
tion Seven of the Charter and the Right to Welfare" (1988) 4 J. L. & Social
Pol'y 1.
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In the first place, the legislatures (both Federal and Provincial) have
launched a sustained attack on the unemployment insurance system 6
and the welfare systems.7 These systems were never particularly gener-
ous, so that when cuts came, there was an increase in homelessness, 8
and a rise in the number of food banks.9 In addition, an inadequate
minimum wage combined with high rental costs in the major cities,
has contributed to an increase in social dislocation. Since the politi-
cians are, rightly, seen as having contributed to this state of affairs,
reformers are tempted to turn away from political activity and to seek
-judicial salvation. The Charter makes this option seem particularly
attractive since the reformers see themselves leaving the ugly world of
politics for the pure world of law. Unfortunately, one cannot turn an
intensely political question such as the level of welfare benefits into a
legal question simply by so deeming it. This attempt to "judicialize
political questions" 10 is doomed to fail.
Secondly, judicial decisions assume an exaggerated importance in
legal education and in legal practice. Many lawyers will subscribe
to a case reporting service but will not keep track of statutes in their
area. It is significant that both Universities and Bar Associations
6. See L. A. Pal, "Revision and Retreat: Canadian Unemployment Insurance 1971-
1981" in J. S. Ismael, ed., Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial
Dimensions (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985) 75. In the 1980's,
the administration of Unemployment Insurance was tightened up so that more
claimants were disqualified or disentitled - see Reuben Hasson, "Discipline
and Punishment in the Law of Unemployment Insurance - A Critical View of
Disqualifications and Disentitlement" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J. 615 at 635.
The government has plans for legislation, which would increase the qualifying
period and increase the number of weeks on disqualification.
7. See, for example, A. Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan: A Twenty
Year Assessment 1966-1986" in K Graham, ed. How Canada Spends Your Tax
Dollar (Toronto: Lorimer, 1988) at 26; National Council of Welfare, Welfare in
Canada, The Tangled Safety Net (Ottawa, 1987).
8. For the situation in Toronto see Parkdale Study, supra, note 3.
9. See G. Riches, Food Banks and The Welfare Crisis (Toronto: C.C.S.D., 1986)
10. See M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989); see also, H. J. Glasbeek and M. Mandel,
"The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84.
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will tend to honour judges rather than a retired Minister or a
politician who guided a piece of legislation through Parliament11
The third reason why judges appear attractive to reformers of the kind
described above is indicated by Professor Terry Ison in his article on
the "Politics of Personal Injury Compensation." 12 Ison makes the
point that whereas business groups tend to be strident in their
demands, groups representing the disabled tend to be meek in making
their demands.13 This less aggressive stance on the part of the
reformers inclines them to seek out the judicial process where no
voices are raised and cool, rational argument is supposed to prevail.
This factor also tends to draw reformers to the courts.
I. PRE-CHARTER LITIGATION
In all the writings advocating the use of the Charter to improve wel-
fare levels, there is no serious consideration given to the case law
before the Charter. I think it is essential to do this because some of the
judges who decided some of the leading cases in the 60's and 70's are
still on the bench (e.g. Chief Justice Dickson and Chief Justice Mon-
nin of the Manitoba Court of Appeal). Many other judges who have
recently retired or died (Chief Justice Laskin, Mr. Justice Spence, Mr.
Justice LeDain and Mr. Justice Freedman) were among the judges
who heard these cases.
Ms. Kathleen Ruff in her article, "The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: A Tool for Social Justice?" 14 suggests that judicial at-
titudes have changed since 1979 when the Bliss15 case was decided. To
prove her point, Ms. Ruff cites two human rights cases - Robichaud v.
11. Even at law schools, judges of the Supreme Court and "eminent" practitioners
will be given preference over academics, other than those who achieved high
judicial office. Thus, neither Osgoode nor the University of Toronto Law
School has any kind of tribute to Frank Scott, one of the great figures in
Canadian legal education.
12. (1977) 27 U. of T. L. J. 385.
13. Ibid. at 396. Writing of a group of disabled claimants, Ison points out that
"their approach to politicians was in the style of applicants for charitable relief
rather in the style used by other organizations of citizens demanding a right to
be heard".
14. Supra, note 4 at 19
15. Bliss v. AG. of Canada (1978), [19791 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417. For a full
account of the case and its sequel, see Leslie A. Pal and F. L. Morton, "Bliss v.
Attorney General of Canada" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 141.
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The Queen,16 where a claim for sexual harassment was upheld and
Quebec Human Rights Commission v. Brossard,17 in which case Mr. Jus-
tice Beetz indicated that the Bliss decision would not be followed in a
human rights case.1
8
There is, however, a world of difference between a human rights com-
plainant and a social security recipient Social security recipients are
subject to a vast number of degrading rules and practices from which
the ordinary citizen is free. 19 To take but one example; someone who
is on welfare is not entitled to a student loan. Recently, a welfare
claimant dishonestly obtained a student loan. Although she obtained
her degree, she was sentenced to a year's imprisonment 20 In the same
issue of the paper that reported this case, a poll reported that 74% of
Canadians thought that people on unemployment used their benefit
period to go on holiday.
21
It is time to examine the cases. Two welfare cases reached the
Supreme Court in the 70's and one unemployment insurance case. In
Alden v.Gaglardi22 the claimant was locked out following a labour dis-
pute. He claimed welfare benefits. The critical section was Section 3 of
the British Columbia Social Assistance Act, which provided:
"(3) Social assistance shall be granted out of funds appropriated by
the Legislature for the purpose to individuals, whether adult or
minor, or to families, who through mental or physical illness or
other exigency are unable to provide in whole or in part by their
own resources, necessities essential to maintain or assist in main-
taining a reasonably normal and healthy existence."
16. (1987), [19871 2 S.C.R. 84, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
17. [19881 2 S.C.R. 279.
18. See the decisions of the Supreme Court Brooks v. Safeway (1989) 59DLR(4th)
321 (S.C.C.) - exclusion of pregnant women from disability held to be viola-
tion of Human Rights Code - and Janzen v. Govereau v. Plaxty Enterprises,
Pharos Restaurant and Tommy Grammas (1989) 59DLR(4th) 352 - sexual harass-
ment amounts to sex discrimination under the Human Rights Code.
19. For a brief description of some of these rules and practices, see Reuben Has-
son, "The Cruel War Social Security Abuse in Canada" (1981) 3 Canadian
Taxation 114.
20. The [Torontol Star (12 June 1989) 2.
21. Ibid. at 3.
22. (1972), [1973] S.C.R. 177, 30 D.L.R. (3d) 760 [cited to D.L.R.].
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The Supreme Court unanimously, but inexplicably, held that a lockout
was not an exigency. "I cannot find that the language of the section
requires the granting of social assistance to individuals who are fit and
able to provide through their own efforts the necessities essential to
maintain a reasonably normal and healthy existence but who have
been temporarily deprived of their source of income by reason of a
labour dispute," wrote Mr. Justice Ritchie for a unanimous court2
Unless the claimant is extremely wealthy, a deprivation of income will
jeopardise the claimant's "normal and healthy existence". Further, a
prolonged lockout may endanger the physical and mental health of
the claimant.24
The second welfare case to reach the Supreme Court was Re LeBlanc v.
City of Transcona.25 In this case, a welfare tribunal had given the wel-
fare claimants an additional amount to meet payments required under
the Bankruptcy Act to meet payments previously incurred. On the face
of it, this seems a beneficial use of money for two reasons. In the first
place, if the additional grant is subtracted from the welfare payment
this would mean that the claimants would be living below the provin-
cial and municipal welfare rates. The matter was put cogently by
counsel for the claimants before the Manitoba Court of Appeal:
"It would not be possible for either the Appeal Board or those who
administer social assistance in the first instance to determine an
applicant's needs in the realistic subjective manner contemplated
by the legislation without taking the applicant's financial obliga-
tions into consideration. If they were to disregard these obligations,
and the creditors chose to exercise their legal rights, the applicants
would be left without enough to meet their basic necessities and the
purpose of the legislation would have been frustrated. There might
be some justification for disregarding debts incurred for frivolous
reasons, but even if that were so the decision... would have to be
made by the welfare authorities."6
23. Ibid. at 764.
24. Claimants who are locked out will also be denied unemployment insurance.
See Hasson, supra, note 19 at 142-3.
25. (1973), [19741 S.C.R. 1261, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 549 [cited to D.L.R..
26. (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 692 at 696-7 (Man. CA.).
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The second reason why the discretionary payments are desirable, is
that we know that the reason why many welfare recipients are
"workshy" is because they have accumulated large debts. These claim-
ants are afraid to work lest the creditor get a wage garnishment (or
other similar) order for twenty or thirty years.27 The majority of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal did not see things this way. Mr. Justice
Monnin, giving the majority decision, stated:
"Inclusion of moneys for payment of legitimate debts as a matter of
public assistance is such a new idea - without mentioning anything
about its propriety - that had the legislature intended such a pay-
ment it ought again to have distinctly so provided. Abuses could
creep in very easily and obviously safeguards must be placed in the
legislation or there is a strong possibility of drain on the tax funds.
A greedy applicant could incur substantial debts of all kinds in
contemplation of his application for assistance. An overly generous
appeal board could tax the scheme to no end."28
This passage displays a shocking lack of knowledge of how the welfare
system works. In the first place, paying the claimant's debts in this
kind of case is probably cheaper for the welfare authorities than keep-
ing the claimants on welfare indefinitely. Once the claimant feels that
she is being freed from the shackles of debt she will begin to search
for a job more vigorously and with greater confidence. Second, if a
welfare authority suspects that the claimant might have incurred debts
with a view to getting.on to welfare, she will be disqualified. 2 9 Third, a
claimant for welfare in Manitoba will have to undergo probably the
severest means test in the country. The claimant may be required to
give up her car and even her work tools.30 It only remains to point out
that the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal was affirmed by the
majority of the Supreme Court 31 Mr. Justice Spence stated that "to
27. See, for example, The Report of the Task Force on Employment Opportunities for
Welfare Recipients (1he Swadron Report) (Toronto, 1972) at 63.
28. Supra, note 26 at 704.
29. For a discussion of these powers, see Hasson, supra, note 19 at 134-6.
30. See report of Manitoba Task Force on Social Assistance, 1983 at 41-2.
31. Supra, note 25. Mr. Justice Spence gave the decision of the Court, with which
Fauteux CJ., Abbott, Martland, Pigeon, and Ritchie JJ. concurred; Laskin J.
dissented.
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provide for the payment of debts in a social assistance statute would
turn the purpose of the statute, at any rate in part, from social assis-
tance to creditor's relief and provide for the payment out of public
funds of the debts due to various creditors, such as banks, finance
companies, credit unions and the like".3 2 The majority's view of wel-
fare seems to consist merely of essentials, such as food and shelter.
But in modern times, a welfare claimant may get a grant enabling her
to go to university33 or to get a wheelchair.
3 4
These two decisions might no longer be good law. In part, they turn
on the legal principle that any violation of the Canada Assistance Plan
did not give the claimant any legal rights.35 These decisions might be
redundant as a result of the decision in Finlay v. Minister of Finance.
3 6
In that case, the court found that Manitoba was in breach of the
Canada Assistance Plan in that the rate of overpayment charged against
Mr. Finlay's social allowance deprived the recipient of his basic needs.
Mr. Justice Teitlebaum noted: "It is undue hardship that is caused to
the person who may not have sufficient funds to feed himself or at
least look after himself with the basic necessities that one requires".37
How will this principle of "undue hardship" affect cases such as Alden
v. Gaglardi38 and LeBlanc v. City of Transcona?39 It is impossible to be
certain. It would be infinitely better if the Canada Assistance Plan laid
down exactly those classes of persons who are entitled to welfare and
those who are not. Already, actions are being prepared on the basis of
the Finlay case. Their success is as problematic as success under the
Charter. The Government for its part has decided to appeal Finlay, if
necessary all the way up to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Finally, in the one important unemployment case heard before the
32. Supra, note 25 at 555-6.
33. See, for example, Re Noble (1973), 2 (no.2) Bull. Can. Wet. Law 44.
34. For a full discussion of discretionary grants, see Marilyn Ginsburg, "Discre-
tionary Power in the General Welfare Assistance Act of Ontario" (1987) 3 J. L.
& Social Pory 1.
35. See also, Re Lofisrom and Murphy (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (Sask. CA.).
36. (1989), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 211 [hereinafter Finlay].
37. Ibid. at 228.
38. Supra, note 22.
39. Supra, note 25.
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Charter, Bliss v. A.G.of Canada,40 the Supreme Court held that a
claimant who was not eligible for regular maternity benefits, could not
claim regular unemployment benefits. This was held not to be sexual dis-
crimination but discrimination on grounds of pregnancy. Fortunately,
this bizarre piece of sophistry has now been overruled by statute.
The decisions of the Courts of Appeal and High Courts are no better
than the trilogy of cases mentioned above. Thus, in Re Fawcett41 the
infant son of Mrs. Fawcett, aged five, was awarded $5000 in a personal
injury case. Mrs. Fawcett sought to put the money in trust for her son
until he reached the age of twenty-one. Mr. Justice Brooke, giving the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, held that these assets were
"liquid assets" which had to be liquidated. The infant was not a defen-
dant since he had means of his own which could be used for his sup-
port on his mother's application to court. Why the boy should want
some of the trust money when he had not asked for any in eight years,
it is not easy to understand. In any event, the effect of the decision, as
Professor Beck points out, is to perpetuate the cycle of poverty.42 For-
tunately, the position of infants in this situation has been improved by
regulation.43
The courts have not required a hearing before unemployment in-
surance44 or welfare benefits45 are terminated. The principle of fair-
ness was applied in Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation.46 In
that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the beneficiary of a
public housing scheme was entitled to a hearing before being
evicted.47
40. Supra, note 15.
41. (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 772 (Ont. CA.).
42. See his comment: "Re Fawcett and Board of Review" (1973) 3 (no.2) Bull. Can.
Wel. Law 1.
43. Under the Family Benefits Act R.R.O. 1980 Reg. 13, (41) an infant plaintiff may
be allowed to keep up to $25,000 as damages in a personal injury action.
44. See the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Letourneau v. C.EJ.C (1985),
24 D.L.R. (4th) 688.
45. Re Wood (1972), 1 (no.1) Bull. Can. Wel. Law 8. This was a decision of the On-
tario Court of Appeal handed down on September 9, 1971.
46. (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 (Ont. CA.).
47. The hearing granted in this case was very informal.
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Some will point to the long line of cases beginning with Re Proc48 in
which the Ontario Courts quashed decisions of the Social Assistance
Review Board in co-habitation cases. Elegant and eloquent as those
decisions are, they break no new ground. These decisions simply
quashed outrageous decisions of the Review Board where there was
not a scintilla of evidence that a relationship of husband and wife ex-
isted.
It is legitimate to ask why the courts were so conservative in the 60's
and 70's. In the first place, the Canadian welfare state dates from
1966-71. It is true that there was a national unemployment insurance
scheme covering 80% of workers dating from 1940, and workers' com-
pensation statutes. But medical insurance, the extension of unemploy-
ment insurance to cover 96% of the workforce and the national welfare
scheme, in the form of the Canada Assistance Plan, came into being be-
tween 1966 and 1971.
I do not think this welfare package was particularly generous. I share
Professor Buchbinder's assessment of the schemes.
"If one considers provincial health insurance premiums, premiums
for unemployment insurance, and contributions to the Canada/-
Quebec pension plans as taxes, then the total picture is one of ex-
acerbating inequality among workers thiough the social and
welfare and taxation programs."49
These programs were regarded with suspicion by a section of the
Press. Thus, the Globe and Mail called the 1971 reforms to the un-
employment insurance system "stupid and immoral".50 Numerous
48. (1974), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. Div. CL). The decision was affirmed by the On-
tario Court of Appeal in an unreported decision; see "Proc in the Ontario Court
of Appeal" (1976) 4 Bull. Can. Wel. Law 44. In Re Warwick and Minister of Com.
munity andSocial Services (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (Ont. CA.), an unsuccessful
attempt was made to argue that the "spouse in need" was entitled to welfare in
her own right. If this had been accepted, it would have effected a revolutionary
and, in my view, beneficial change.
49. See his essay, "Inequality and the Social Services" in Moscovitch and Drover,
eds., Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social Welfare (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981) 358.
50. J. Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 1971
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972) 358; quoted in Pal, supra, note 6.
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economists were investigating whether the Unemployment Insurance
system produced malingering.51 Finally, the Government began mak-
ing cuts in the scheme in the mid-seventies 52 and began a million dol-
lar advertising campaign against unemployment insurance fraud.5
3
In this environment, judges would have to have had something of a
radical disposition to buck this tide. Now, Canadian judges have never
had a reputation for being progressive. Most of them are male, mid-
dle-aged and have worked for corporate interests. Even the academics
among them (Laskin, LeDain, Beetz and McLaughlin) showed little
interest in income maintenance law, during their scholarly careers. It
is doubtful if the situation is any better today. Students all over the
country will learn the the details of the formation of contracts, the
minutiae of real property law and the technicalities of civil procedure.
Only a few will learn about unemployment insurance and welfare law.
It is significant that the Canadian Bar Review, in its long history,54 and
the University of Toronto Law Journal55 have never seen fit to deal with
these subjects. Other Canadian law journals, fare little better. Very few
Canadian law students and teachers will obtain publications of say,
the National Council of Welfare, despite the fact that these may be
obtained free and despite the fact that these publications contain
material that is of general social importance.56
I. THE CHARTER AND SOCIAL POLICY
A. WELFARE
In her excellent paper for the Thomson Commission,57 Sandra Wain
showed that the question of putting welfare benefits in the Charter
had been debated at the time the Charter was drafted 58 but this idea
51. See, for example, Derek Hum, Unemployment Insurance and Work Effort: Issues
Evidence and Policy Directions (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1981) bibli-
ography 30-4.
52. See Pal, supra, note 6.
53. See statement of Mr. Bud Cullen, then Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion in Canada, House of Commons Debates (23 January 1978) 2301.
54. 1923-
55. 1933-
56. See, for example, their reports on The Hidden Welfare System (1976 & 1979) and
Bearing the Benefits, Sharing the Burdens (1978).
57. See Wain, supra, note 5.
58. Ibid. at 28.
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was rejected.5 9 Even if a right to welfare and well-being had been in-
cluded as it is in the New York State Constitution, it is doubtful if this
would have made any difference. In New York, the State Constitution
provides, in Article XVII, Section 1, that the "aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions and in such manner as the legislature may
from time to time determine... ."60 Despite these high sounding words,
we know from reading Jonathan Kozol's brilliant book, Rachel and Her
Children,61 that many of New York City's homeless are dependent on
charity.
Despite the fact that welfare benefits were thought to be unaffected by
the Charter, most provinces used s. 28 and later s. 15 to equalize
benefits. How much of this activity took place cannot be known. It
would also be wrong to think that reformers won every battle. Joan
Dawkins describes how in Nova Scotia an amendment was passed to
the Family Benefits Act eliminating support for teenage mothers with
dependent children.62 There were also severe limitations in using the
Charter. It was not used, for example, to stop the 100,000 welfare sear-
ches that took place in Quebec between the spring of 1986 and the
winter of 1987.63
Another string was added to the litigator's bow when the Supreme
Court of Canada decided in Reference Re s.94(2) of the Motor Vehicle
Act,64 that it could strike down laws on substantive as well as on pro-
cedural grounds. Despite these weapons, Charter litigation has
produced virtually no gains but has produced some losses in the wel-
fare field.
The most astonishing series of cases occurred in Nova Scotia in a tril-
ogy of cases where single fathers, who were not eligible for Family
Benefits attempted to obtain those which were available for women. In
59. The reason for the exclusion is that the Charter was meant to act as a brake on
power.
60. This provision has been used in a few cases but has not any great effect.
61. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988).
62. See her article, "Living to Fight Another Day: The Story of Dalhousie Legal
Aid" (1988) 3 J. L. & Social Pol'y I at 15.
63. See A. Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide: The Case for our Civil Liberties (Toron-
to: Lester Orpen & Dennys, 1988) at 170.
64. [19851 2 S.C.R. 486.
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Boudreau v. Family Benefits Board,65 an unemployed divorced father
with three children applied for assistance under the Family Benefits Act.
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court Appeal Division held that the claim
failed because s. 15 of the Charter had not yet come into force and s.
28 did not make every kind of discrimination illegal.
In Phillips v. Social Assistance Board66 a single father with a dependent
child born out of wedlock argued that the denial to him of welfare
benefits constituted a violation under s. 15 of the Charter. Mr. Justice
Nunn found that there was a violation of s. 15 but then denied both
the claimant and women Family Benefits! This amazing decision was
affirmed by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division.67 Mr.
Justice Jones, giving the decision of the court; referred to Chief Justice
Dickson's judgement in Hunter v. Southam68 and stated:
"The interpretation of the Charter should be, as the judgement in
Southain emphasizes, a generous rather than a legalistic one.' 69
But the judgement in this case is legalistic in the extreme and there is
not a shred of generosity in the opinion. In Basile v. A.G.,70 the same
court displayed great generosity to door to door sellers who were
relieved of the obligation of being permanent residents of Nova Scotia.
It might be argued that although the decisions are absurd, the Charter
litigation must be given credit for giving Family Benefits to men, as
eventually happened by legislation in Nova Scotia. But several provin-
ces (including Ontario) originally denied Family Benefits to men. This
restriction was removed by lobbying and it does not appear that this
tactic was tried in Nova Scotia. The Charter litigation, although no
welfare claimant lost materially by it,7 ' was fraught with danger. The
Legislature might have lowered benefits of all single parents' Family
Benefits to the level of general welfare. If this had been done, it might
have further endangered the health of women and children.
65. (1984), 66 N.S.R. (2d) 271 (N.S.CA.).
66. (1986), 73 N.S.R. 415 (N.S.T.D.).
67. Reference Re Family Benefits Act (N.S.), Section 5 (1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338.
68. 119841 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
69. Supra, note 67 at 346.
70. (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 219 (N.S.CA.).
71. See Mandel, supra, note 10 at 264.
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In the following year, welfare claimants seemed to have achieved vic-
tory. In Silano v. Queen in the Right of British Columbia,72 Mr. Justice
Spencer held that a difference of $25 paid to single persons under the
age of 26 for a period of eight months was unconstitutional. The
decision came out on August 5, 1987. By August 13, the Provincial
Government had reduced benefits for all welfare recipients over 26.
Since there are more welfare recipients over the age of 26, than under
that age, the result of the litigation was that welfare claimants in
British Columbia were worse off than before the litigation.
In Re Shewchuk v. Ricard73 the complainant gave birth to a child born
out of wedlock. She took proceedings under the Child Paternity and
Support.Act claiming maintenance for the child. The putative father ar-
gued that the Child Paternity and Support Act was unconstitutional by
discriminating on the grounds of sex. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that there was a violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter but
the law was reasonable in a free and democratic society under s. 1.
Nemetz CJ.B.C. gave the crux of the court's opinion:
"Women bear children not men. Many women bear children out of
wedlock These women ordinarily have the primary responsibility
for rearing the children. Most of these women are young and
without the economic means to support these children adequate-
ly."74
Thus, in return for taking care of the child, the mother is provided
with legal aid so that she can sue the putative father for maintenance.
But, as the Finer Commission demonstrated in 197375 women on wel-
fare and poor women generally will only be able to recover a fraction
of their welfare benefit.76 People in the position of Ms. Shewchuk
(many of whom will be on welfare) are being used by the relevant
authorities to act as unpaid debt collectors. It is only when the puta-
72. (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 407 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Silanoj.
73. (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C.CA.) [hereinafter Sheivchukl .
74. bid. at 435.
75. Report of the Committee on Single Parent Families (Cmnd 5629) (London:
H.M.S.O., 1974).
76. Ibid. volume I at 104, table 4.10.
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tive father cannot be found (a not uncommon occurrence), prefers to
go to gaol rather than pay maintenance, or has very little money with
which to pay maintenance, that someone in Ms. Shewchuk's position
will be able to claim welfare. As Judy Fudge has rightly pointed out,
an attempt is being made to turn a public responsibility into a private
one.
77
A case that is reminiscent of Shewchuk, is Re Clifton and Director of In-
come Maintenance.78 The applicant sought family benefits as a sole
support mother to a 13 month old child. The applicant refused to give
any information as to the identity of the father. The Social Assistance
Review Board filed a statutory declaration stating that Ms.Clifton was
unaware of the father's identity. The Board, however, denied her
benefits on the grounds that she had failed to provide information
necessary to enable the Board to reach a decision. In at least one case,
the Social Assistance Board of Ontario, a tribunal not known for its
progressive decisions, held that a mother who refused to name a father
was entitled to welfare benefits.79 Mr. Justice Steele giving the decision
of the Divisional Court held that the claimant had not done every-
thing in her power to obtain her benefits. This provision is used in
cases where the claimant sells (or has sold) her property at an under-
value.80 Its use in the present case is bizarre.
The second ground for the decision was:
"This invasion into the privacy of the applicant is authorized by
statute because she applied for a benefit The director had the right
to refuse the application for lack of information."81
The reference to the claimant's privacy should have alerted counsel for
the applicant's mind to the decision in Hunter v. Southam82 which had
been decided only eighteen months previously. In that case, it will be
remembered, the Supreme Court bestowed the gift of privacy on cor-
77. See her article, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the
Limits to the use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall L . 485 at 518-9.
78. (1985), 53 O.R. (2d) 33 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Clifton]
79. See "Re Unwed Mother who Refuses to Name Father" (1973) 2(no.2) Bull. Can.
Wel. Law 41.
80. See Hasson, supra, note 19 at 134-5.
81. Ibid. at 36.
82. Supra, note 68.
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porations. To have made this argument in Clifton would not have
meant certain success as cases involving humbler citizens than large
corporations have been lost.83 But it is an argument that should have
been made.
The one mildly bright spot in the welfare area is the decision of Kelly
J. in R. v. Hebb.84 Mrs. Hebb was a welfare recipient in receipt of be-
tween $450 and $500 a month of which $300 was spent on rent. She
had a long history of mental illness and suffered from slight mental
retardation. Mrs. Hebb was a smoker and she was caught stealing a
packet of cigarettes. She was prosecuted and convicted under the
Criminal Code and fined $500 or sentenced to 30 days imprisonment.
Kelly . quoted from the Law Reform Commission Working Paper
No.6 on "Fines" which pointed out:
"... that judges be prohibited from imposing a fine and simul-
taneously imposing a sentence of imprisonment in case the fine is
not paid."
85
It was argued before Kelly J. that before someone aged 16-22 could be
imprisoned, there had to be issued a report as to the offenders ability
to pay. There was no similar requirement for persons over the age of
22. Kelly J. held that this age discriminatiqn violated the Charter. Con-
sequently, in cases such as Mrs. Hebb's there had to be an inquiry as
to her ability to pay the fine.
It is impossible to say as yet, how important the Hebb decision will be.
If one takes the facts of the case, it is of little importance because most
- if not all - provinces would refuse to prosecute in such circumstan-
ces. In Alberta, there were many more serious cases and no prosecu-
tions were brought8 6 On the other hand, if a welfare recipient was
guilty of fraud in the amount of, say, $1000, would a court be entitled
83. See Re Canadian Union of Postal Workers (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 67, in which
Dixon J. of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench upheld the right to search post-
al employees lockers and any item carried in and out of any postal facility.
Hunter v. Southam was not applied.
84. (1989), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 137 (N.S.S.C.) [hereinafter Hebbl.
85. (October 1974).
86. Alberta Social Services and Community Health, "Final Report of the Welfare
Ineligibility Study - Fraud and Error in the Public Assistance Programs"
(mimeo, 1979).
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to make an order ordering the welfare recipient to pay $5, $10 or $20 a
month? Such a deduction might run foul of the principle in Finlay87
that deductions will not be permitted because the deductions might
lead to an inequitable result for the claimant. Alternatively, the courts
might hold that the Finlay principle does not apply to criminal fines.
One will have to wait and see.
What is needed in this area of the law are the kind of guidelines laid
down by the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Stewart.88 Lord Lane
CJ., giving the judgement of the court, pointed out:
"Policy with regard to prosecuting has undergone a marked change
during the 1980's. Social Security cases, for example, prosecuted in
1980-1 totalled 30,116. In 1983-4 the corresponding figure was
11,000 due to a change of policy. Nowadays, the policy is for cases
involving small amounts, except where there are special features
such as repeated fraud... It follows that the most common method
of enforcement is warning and recovery. Unlike the situation be-
tween fraudster and victim in other spheres, here the fraudster is in
a very vulnerable position vis-a-vis his victim, the department. A
warning as to the consequences of any future offending coupled
with recovery of the sum overpaid may often be enough, so it
seems, to prevent any re-offending, by that individual."89
One may have some disagreement with these guidelines9° but they
seem infinitely preferable as a way of dealing with the problem of wel-
fare fraud than the approach exemplified by Hebb.
Thus, the Charter saved Mrs. Hebb from serving 30 days in prison
and this must be regarded as a boon. However, the other cases
(Silano,91 Shewchuk,92 Phillips93 and Clifion94) must be regarded as los-
87. Supra, note 36.
88. (1987), 1 W.L.R. 559 (CA.).
89. Ibid. at 560-1.
90. In many of the small cases of fraud I would favour merely a warning.
91. Supra, note 72.
92. Supra, note 73.
93. Supra, note 66.
94. Supra, note 78.
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ses. Enormous time and expenditure95 were put into these cases. This
time could have been better spent lobbying politicians and/or forming
welfare coalitions. Kathleen Ruff argues that it is possible to litigate as
well as to lobby.96 But, if the losses outweigh the gains, what is the
point of litigation? Tony Prosser in his excellent study of test case
litigation in England concluded that that strategy failed in that country
as well.97 Finally, no one in their right mind, would urge a policy of
welfare test litigation before the Reagan Supreme Court.
Second, unless one has the resources of a mega-law firm,98 legal
clinics do not have the financial or human resources to mount Charter
challenges. 99
B. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Undoubtedly, the most important decision in unemployment in-
surance is Schacter v. R 100 In this case, a father wanted to share his 15
week maternity benefit with his wife so that he could stay home while
his wife went out to work. Such sharing of the 15 week period was not
95. Professor Andrew Petter quotes a newspaper report in 1985 estimating that the
cost of taking a criminal case to the Supreme Court of Canada "can be more
than $34,500" and the cost of a civil case to be in excess of $200,000. See his ar-
ticle, "Canada's Charter Flight: Soaring Backwards into the Future" (1989) 16
3. of Law and Society 151 at 155. It is appropriate at this point, to acknowledge
Professor Petter's pioneering role in criticising the Charter. All critics of the
Charter have built on his work, in particular, on his seminal article, "The
Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Supreme Court L Rev. 473.
96. See supra, note 5.
97. See his Test Cases for the Poor (London: C.P.A.G., 1983) (pamphlet 60).
98. Law firms in the large metropolitan areas are growing bigger and they are
merging with large law firms in other provinces. These mergers have been sus-
tained in the teeth of provincial bar rules. The 'open sesame' in these cases has
been the guarantee of freedom of association; see Black v. Law Society (1989),
58 D.LR. (4th) 317.
99. For an extreme example of what happens to a legal clinic which engages in
Charter litigation, see the frightening experience of the Dalhousie Legal Aid
Clinic which was very active in Charter litigation, as illustrated by Joan Daw-
kins article, supra, note 62. Even if the calamitous results that followed in Nova
Scotia do not occur elsewhere, Charter litigation (or even ordinary litigation)
will have the effect of turning away clients and/or restricting the amount of
lobbying.
100. (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 525 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) [hereinafter Schacter].
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permitted by the maternity provisions but was permitted by the adop-
tion provisions of the Act which allowed the 15 weeks to be split be-
tween both parents. The Schacters argued that the difference between
natural birth and adoption violated section 15. Mr. Justice Strayer
seems to have embraced this argument with some passion. The Schac-
ters had asked to divide the 15 weeks; as Professor Mandel has ob-
served, the Schacters got more than they asked for.101 Both of them
got 15 weeks leave. The evidence in the case was that the increased
cost of such a ruling could be between ten and fifty million dollars.
Because of the financial cost of the decision, Strayer J. postponed his
decision until there had been an appeal. Strayer J. left it to Parliament
to either abolish the adoption benefits or it (Parliament) must provide
benefits of equal duration to both adoptive and natural parents.
102
The Government has responded in its policy paper - Success in the
Works1 °3 - which sets up (at page 10) a tier of maternity and parental
benefits that runs as follows:
"Fifteen weeks of maternity benefits are available at the birth of the
child; ten weeks of parental benefits are available to natural or
adoptive parents, either mother of father or shared between them."
These provisions are not particularly generous, but they represent a
step forward. However, it is important to amend the provincial
Employment Standards Act so as to provide protection in provincial law
for a father's job security. At present, only mothers enjoy the benefits
of the Act - in brief, they may not be dismissed for taking maternity
leave and their return to their jobs is guaranteed.
It would be churlish to deny Strayer J. credit for these reasonable
provisions, but some credit must go to the Government, which, having
made enormous cutbacks in other areas of unemployment insurance,
felt the need to provide some kind of offsetting benefit.
Re Tetreault-Gadoury and Canada Employment and Immigration104 is an
unhappy decision. In this case, the provision denying unemployment
insurance benefits to claimants over 65 (s. 31(1)) was struck down as
101. See supra, note 10 at 265.
102. The Government has appealed.
103. Released 11 April 1989. (Employment and Immigration, Canada)
104. (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 384 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Tetreault-Gadouryl .
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being in violation of s. 15 of the Charter. In the present case, the
claimant was entitled to a minimum of 25 weeks benefit (in addition
to her regionally extended benefits which were not calculated). 10 5 The
applicant was able to claim only 3 weeks benefit
Lacombe J., giving the judgement of the court, stated:
"rhe most harmful and singular aspect of s.31 of the Act is that it
permanently deprives the applicant and any other person of her
age, of the status of a socially insured person by making her a pen-
sioner of the state, even if she is still looking for a new job. Regard-
less of her personal skills and situation, she is as it were,
stigmatized as belonging to the of persons who are no longer
part of the active population."'I
The court seems to have overlooked one of the cardinal features of
sound social policy - that it is undesirable to stack benefits. At age 65,
a worker will usually obtain Old Age Security and Canada (or Quebec
Pension) Plan benefits. It is entirely reasonable for the state to prevent
cumulation of benefits even though the number of potential claimants
is small. 10 7 If the argument is that Old Age Security and the Canada
Pension Plan provide inadequate benefits, then the answer is to im-
prove them by having - as Harry Glasbeek has argued - a National
Superannuation Scheme providing flat-rate benefits to all citizens at
retirement age.
108
It only remains to mention Re Goldstein v. RI 09 In that case, Ms.
Goldstein challenged the provision disqualifying a spouse from claim-
ing unemployment insurance benefits. In a careful judgement, Potts J.
upheld the exclusion:
"...person working for his spouse is likely to be in a position to af-
fect his term of employment and thereby control his eligibility for
benefits... both spouses would be in a position to benefit monetari-
ly from the unemployment of the spouse. Clearly this is not so
105. The Government has announced its intention of codifying this decision; see
text, supra, note 103 at 10.
106. Supra, note 104 at 403-4.
107. In 1986, 4,000 unemployed workers over the age of 65 were still actively looking
for work: ibid. at 406.107
108. See his article, "A Proposal for a Non-Earnings Related Retirement Scheme"
(1980) 2 Canadian Taxation 186.
109. (1988), 51 D.L.R. (4th) 583 (Ont H.C.)
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where the parties are at arm's length. Finally abuse and manipula-
tion is Isic] virtually impossible to ascertain . 1 1
Although the judge does not mention "tax avoidance", it would be
very surprising if the judge did not have that consideration in mind.
In Re AG. of Canada v. Druken,11 a claimant brought an unsuccessful
challenge to s. 31 by using the Human Rights Act.
Of the two major unemployment insurance decisions, Schacter1 12 is
strangely constructed but seems to have led to a reasonable result. The
decision in Tetreault-Gadoury,113 however, shows no understanding of
elementary principles of social policy and is a most unfortunate
decision.
C. OTHER SOCIAL BENEFITS
The record of the courts in dealing with other income maintenance
programmes has been lamentable.
In Bregman v. A.G. of Canada,114 The claimant sought benefits under
the War Veterans Allowance Act. Section 31(4) of the Act required War
Veterans to be a veteran of World War I or. World War II and either
(a) domiciled in Canada or (b) having had resided in Canada for a
least 10 years before combat The claimant served in the Russian army
with distinction between 1941 and 1945. He came to Canada in 1976
and took out citizenship in 1980. In 1983, he applied for War Veterans
Benefits but was denied them because he had not been in Canada for
10 years. He died on January 11, 1986. Irene Bregman was added as a
party. It was agreed that if her husband qualified for an allowance in
his lifetime, his widow might now apply. Mr Justice Saunders rejected
the claim:
"In the context of the legislation, in my opinion, persons domiciled
in Canada at the time of enlistment are more closely related to
members of the Canadian Forces and to Canada.
1 15
110. Ibid. at 588.
111. (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (F.CA.).
112. Supra, note 100.
113. Supra, note 104.
114. (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 596 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Bregman].
115. Ibid. at 601.
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This is no doubt true but the effect of the decision is to create a
second-class type of veteran - something s. 15 is supposedly designed
to prevent. The foreign veteran who comes to Canada and spends ten
years here would appear to be making more of a contribution to
Canadian life than the Canadian-born war veteran who, after the war,
lives in the Bahamas and never returns to Canada. The foreign
veteran would seem to be more "Canadian" than the exile in the
Bahamas. Yet, it is the latter and not the former, who will receive War
Veterans Benefits. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal
which repeated Saunders J.'s "Canadianess" rationale.116 The Court
then reviewed the history of the legislation and found that Parliament
had found it to be satisfactory. But under a system of judicial review,
the courts are supposed to review critically the decisions made by Par-
liament.
In two family allowance cases, the Federal Court of Appeal avoided
the constitutional issues on spurious grounds. InA.G. of Canada v. Vin-
cer,117 the claimant-husband signed a separation agreement with his
wife. The parents had joint custody of the children. Under s. 7 of the
Family Allowances Act, family allowances are to be paid to the mother.
The review committee held s. 7 unconstitutional and gave half the
benefit to the father and half to the mother. Incredibly, the Federal
Court of Appeal held that the review committee 118 had no jurisdiction
to apply the Charter. If Mr. Vincer wants to bring his claim he must
do so before the Federal Court. Mr. Vincer might wonder how it is
that certain labour arbitrators have jurisdiction to apply the
Charter,119 whereas a review committee, set up by Parliament, does
not have such jurisdiction.
The Federal Court of Appeal also avoided the constitutional question
in A.G. of Canada v. Bibi Alli.120 Mrs. Alli and her husband came to
Canada from Guyana in 1980. Both claimed to be convention
116. 57 O.R. (2d) 409 (Ont. CA.) at 411.
117. [19881 1 F.C. 714 (F.CA.).
118. In Tetreault-Gadoury, supra, note 104, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
Board of Referees under the Unemployment Insurance Act had jurisdiction to
make rulings on the Charter. In so doing, it overruled previous decisions. It
may be now that review committees can apply the Charter.
119. See cases cited by Fudge, supra, note 77 at 508 (note 80).
120. (1988), 51 D.L.R. (4th) 555 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Bibi Alli]. See criticism by M.
Bossin, (1988) 4 . L & Social Pol'y 172.
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refugees. In 1981, they were joined by their two young children. In
1983, a third young child was born. As refugee claimants, they had
been given employment authorization. They also paid taxes. In
February 1983, Mrs. Alli submitted an application for benefits. Two
and a half years later, Mrs. Alli was told she was not eligible.
Mrs. Alli appealed to a review committee1 21 arguing that s. 2(3) of the
Family Allowances regulations was unconstitutional. This regulation
provided for payment of a Family Allowance - "the prescribed
circumstances", referring to visitors or permit holders, were such that
persons must have been admitted to Canada for a period of not less
than one year and have had income which is subject to the Income
Tax Act.
The review committee, by a vote of 2-1, held s. 3(1) and s. 2(3) of the
Family Allowance regulations unconstitutional. Since visitors to
Canada for a year were entitled to Family Allowances, the majority
felt that the Allis, who had been lawful visitors for eight years, should
be entitled to Family Allowances. The Federal Court of Appeal held
that the review committee had no jurisdiction to hear the Charter
issue. The Allis have now begun an action in Federal Court This ac-
tion will be infinitely more expensive than if the Allis had been al-
lowed to proceed by the review committee. Professor Petter estimates
that the cost of a civil action will be at least $200,000.122 It should be
pointed out that Mr. Vincer and Bibi had no conceivable way of find-
ing out that the review committee had no jurisdiction. Indeed, in Bibi
Alli,123 the Government did not argue that the tribunal had no juris-
diction. It might be that after the decision in Re Tetreault-Gadoury and
Canada Employment and Immigration124 - in which case the Federal
Court of Appeal reversed previous decisions which had held that the
Umpire and the Board of Referees could not apply the Charter 12 -
Vincer126 and Bibi Alli1 27 might be decided differently today, but claim-
121. 1 should disclose that I chaired this committee.
122. See supra, note 95.
123. Supra, note 120.
124. Supra, note 104.
125. See, for example, Zwarich v. A.G. of Canada [19871 3 F.C. 253.
126. See supra, note 117.
127. Supra, note 120.
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ants might not be prepared to take the chance.
In R v. Powell and Powell,128 an Alberta provincial court judge seemed
to break new ground. In that case, the parents were charged with two
counts of truancy contrary to s. 180 of the School Act. The accused
could not provide a lawyer and legal aid would not grant one. The ac-
cused argued that his right to a fair trial was being jeopardised under
s. 7 and s. 11 of the Charter. Litsky P.CJ. upheld this argument and
directed that counsel be appointed to represent the Powells.
But it turns out that the courts have long exercised a power to order
that counsel be appointed to represent an accused. In R v. White,
129
the accused had been denied legal aid because the offence was a sum-
mary one. McDonald . ordered counsel to be appointed after taking
into account a number of factors: (a) the financial position of the ac-
cused; (b) the educational level of the accused; (c) the complexity of
the case; (d) the difficulty of marshalling relevant evidence; and (e) the
likelihood if imprisonment in event of conviction.
130
A minor breakthrough occurred in Mullaly v. Younggreen,131 where the
British Columbia County Court held that someone who intended to
appeal a decision of the Small Claims Court was not required to pay
the full amount of the judgement plus $50 as security for costs. This
provision violated s. 15(1) of the Charter since it discriminated against
the indigent. This is a small but welcome victory.
132
Finally, I want to contrast two cases on day care. In R. v. King,133 the
appellants were charged with operating a day nursery without a
licence as required by the Day Nurseries Act. The trial judge concluded
that the law infringed the parents rights under the Charter. The trial
judge concluded that the law deprived poor parents of the right to pur-
sue a livelihood. The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that there was
no infringement of the right to work
Dubin A.CJ.O. also found that the Act was not discriminatory. Indeed,
128. (1984), 51 A.R. 191 (Alta. Prey. Ct.).
129. (1976), 1 Alta. L.R. (2d) 292 (Aita. S.C.).
130. Ibid. at 306.
131. (1988), 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 24 (B.C. Co. CL).
132. Remarkably, the decision was given in Chambers.
133. (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Ont. CA.).
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he pointed out that the argument was not pursued on appeal. The
court rightly pointed out that "[plublic funding of day care is a social
problem which is beyond the reach of the Court" 134 The Courts can
do no more about inadequate day care than they can about homeless-
ness or poverty.
This case must be compared with Symes v. R.,135 in which Cullen J.
gave a remarkable judgement with far reaching implications. The
plaintiff, then a partner in a law firm, had her expenses in the form of
a salary paid to a nanny disallowed as a business expense between
1982 and 1985. Revenue Canada took the view that these were per-
sonal and living expenses.
After 1985, the plaintiff was able to use section 15 of the Charter and
she did so. She argued: (a) that the disallowance as a business expense
of child care expenses incurred to permit a parent to earn income
from a business drew an invidious distinction between Parent
employers and other employers who are allowed to deduct from busi-
ness income the salaries paid to employees; (b) that the disallowance
as a business expense of child care expenses incurred to permit a
parent to earn income from a business has a disproportionate impact
on women who remain primarily responsible for child care in our
society; and (c) that wages or salaries paid to spouses or children, were
also in certain cases expenses deductible as business expenses. 136
Cullen J. was greatly impressed by the evidence of Dr. Patricia
Armstrong, a sociologist at York University. Cullen J. summarized her
evidence thus:
"Armstrong's evidence reveals that the influx of women of child
bearing age into entrepreneurship and the workplace, especially in
the 1970's and after, has effected a major change in the landscape
and in the very conduct of business. Thus, the question of the
deductibility of Simpson's salary must be interpreted in view of the
social and economic realities of the time."137
134. Ibid. at 569.
135. (31 May 1989). Case T-1989-152 [unreported.
136. Ibid. at 4.
137. Ibid. at 11.
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It is a "reality" that since World War II, more women have gone out to
work. The reasons for this are many and need not be analyzed in
detail here.138 What is not a reality is that women have entered the
workforce by hiring nannies. The overwhelming majority of women
who go out to work use daycare, baby sitters or grandparents to look
after the child. In any event, Cullen J. held that the plaintiff was en-
titled to claim the expenses for her nanny after 1985. The result of this
decision is first, to favour the rich self-employed at the expense of
poor employees. It is this group who will have to pay for the rich
persons' nannies.
Perhaps even more ironical is the fact that a decision which is ex-
plicitly made to help women, will almost certainly help more men
than women. As Mr. Shifrin has pointed out, 3/4 of the self-employed
are men and they will be the principal beneficiaries of this decision. 139
Symes is another example of a misguided intervention. When Parlia-
ment intends to benefit the rich or men (as opposed to women), it is
usually clear that this is what it is doing. In Symes, the judgement
reads as if Cullen J. had no clear idea of what he was trying to do.
Before attempting a final evaluation of the Canadian jurisprudence
under the Charter, it is necessary to look at the experience of the
United States Supreme Court in income maintenance cases, since
many Canadian commentators purport to derive authority and in-
spiration from that Court. It will be shown that the experience in that
Court offers little comfort to those who seek to improve our income
maintenance schemes by judicial action.
II. THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE - IS THERE HOPE?
Many of the commentators who want to introduce major changes
through judicial review in social policy14 look longingly at American
jurisprudence and they derive their inspiration from a few Supreme
Court decisions. One very clear sign that welfare jurisprudence was of
marginal importance during the period of the Burger Court (1969-
1986)141 is that, of the two books on the Burger Court - Herman
138. Not the least important is the fact that for many families, two salaries are es-
sential to survival.
139. The [Toronto] Star (5 June 1989) A19.
140. See the authors quoted above, supra, notes 1-5.
141. There were almost no income maintenance cases decided by the Warren Court.
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Schwartz, The Burger Years142 and Vincent Blasi, The Burger Court143 -
there is a single essay on welfare rights and the constitution. 144 Profes-
sor Frank Michaelman's well-known essay "On Protecting the Poor
Through The Fourteenth Amendmenf"145 now reads like fantasy, even
though it was written just over twenty years ago, and was taken very
seriously when first written.
The major case is undoubtedly Goldberg v. Kelly.146 This case enjoys
the same status in welfare law that Brown v. Board of Education147 en-
joys in civil rights law. But just as it is important to understand the
limitations of Brown,148 it is vital to understand the limitations of
Goldberg v. Kelly.149 In that case, the Supreme Court held, by a
majority, that someone who was in receipt of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children's Benefits could not be cut off from receiving such
benefits without being given a hearing. Professor O'Neil has pointed
out that while the Supreme Court provided protection at the termina-
tion stage, they did nothing to guarantee a hearing to someone who
had been denied welfare benefits. 150 O"Neil recognized that some wel-
fare authorities might seek to offset the new obligation to give a hear-
ing before termination of welfare benefits by making it more difficult
to qualify for welfare benefits at the iiitial stage.
151
Professor Richard Titmuss pointed out that although Goldberg v. Kelly
offered admirable procedural protection, the level of benefits provided
in New York State was incredibly low. Thus, he (Titmuss) pointed out
that in New York City, in 1968, a male welfare recipient was entitled to
142. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988).
143. (London: Yale University Press, 1983).
144. See Robert W. Bennett, "The Burger Court and the Poor" in ibid. at 46.
145. (1969) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7.
146. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
148. Ibid.
149. Supra, note 146.
150. See his essay, "Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing
Cases" [1970] Supreme Court Review 161 at 168.
151. Ibid. at 171. O'Neil found that there were already many errors made in the
eligibility process.
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the following items: one pair of winter trousers at $7.50 (regular sizes),
the household had a right to one can opener at 35 cents, and in the
lavatory one toilet tissue holder at 75 cents but only if your landlord
does not have to give you one.152 In January 1989, welfare benefits for a
family of three headed by a mother came to $539 a month in New
York State.153 How three people can live on this benefit in New York
defies comprehension. In Mississippi the relevant amount is $120 and
in Alabama it is $118.15 4
Goldberg v. Kelly was distinguished in Matthews v. Eldridge.155 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that a person claiming disability benefits
was not entitled to a hearing before being cut off benefits. Mr. Justice
Powell, giving the opinion of a six person majority, said that welfare
was "given to persons on the very margins of subsistence".
156
"Eligibility for disability benefits... is not based on financial need.
Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the workers income or support
from many other sources, such as earnings of other family mem-
bers, workmen's compensation awards ... private insurance, public
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assis-
tance....n157
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurred, dis-
sented. 158 They pointed out that Mr. Justice Powell's resources were
"speculative" 159 and that the court could not gauge need on an in-
dividual basis. 160 Further, they indicated that in the present case there
was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family's furniture
was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife and children to sleep in
one bed.16
1
152. See his article, "Welfare 'Rights' Law and Discretion" (1971) Political Quarterly
113 at 125.
153. See table in New York Times (15 March 1989) 11.
154. Ibid.
155. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
156. Ibid. at 340.
157. Ibid. at 340-1.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid. at 350.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
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If Eldridge claims public assistance while waiting for an appeal under
the disability scheme he has to undergo the indignity and injustice of
a means test. The Eldridge decision has been widely criticised, 162 but
the chances of its being overruled at the present time are perilously
close to zero.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,163 the Supreme Court struck down, by a
majority of 6-3, legislation passed by Pennsylvia, Connecticut and
District of Columbia. This legislation required one year's residence in
the state or district before the claimant could claim welfare. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, giving the judgement of the majority, held that:
"the effect of the waiting period requirement in each case is to cre-
ate two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from
each other except that one is composed of residents who have
resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have
resided less than a year in that jurisdiction".
16
This, in the majority's eyes was "invidious discrimination". 165
Chief Justice Warren dissented, as did Justices Black and Harlan, al-
though they gave separate opinions. Chief Justice Warren stated that
Congress had adopted the year's residence requirement because it
recognised "the apprehensions of many States that an increase in
benefits without minimal residency requirements would result in an
inability to provide an adequate welfare system". 166
The decision in Shapiro v. Thompson 167 may be to improve the lot of
welfare recipients who travel from states with lower welfare levels, but
there will probably be a lowering of benefits for welfare recipients in
the state with higher benefit levels.
168
In any event, the problem is academic in Canada because the Canada
162. The most incisive criticism is by Mashaw, "The Supreme Courts Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge" (1976) 44 U.
Chicago L Rev. 28.
163. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
164. Ibid. at 627.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid. at 651.
167. Ibid.
168. See the recent movement of Welfare recipients from Illinois ($342 A.F.D.C. a
month) to Wisconsin ($517 A.F.D.C. a month); New York Times (15 March
1989) 11.
What's Your Favourite Right?
Assistance Plan specifically forbids residency requirements for welfare
in s. 6(2)(d) of the Act.
Section 6(b) of the Charter allows "any laws providing for reasonable
residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly
provided services". 169 This provision would allow a province that set
up abortion services legislation or dental care services to insist on a 6
or 12 month residency requirement. I think this is undesirable because
it will be impossible to separate the bona fide emigrants from those
who have just come to avail themselves of the service.
In a series of criminal procedure decisions, the Supreme Court ex-
tended protection to the accused. In 1956, in Griffin v. Illinois,170 the
Supreme Court held that an accused person was entitled to a free
transcript to enable him to appeal. In Gideon v. Wainwright,171 the
Court held that accused persons had a right of counsel in all felony
cases. In Douglas v. California (1963),172 the Supreme Court held that a
state could not require a showing of merit of the defence from the
poor while not requiring this showing from the affluent in providing
counsel.
Commentators began to urge that these decisions be extended to the
civil law.173 This seemed to be about to occur when the Supreme
Court decided Boddie v. Connecticut (1971).174 In that case, Connecticut
refused to provide legal aid for a divorce. The Court held, per Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan, that the requirement of fees from the indigents effectively
excluded them "from the only forum effectively empowered to settle
their disputes".175 This case is of little or no value in Canada since
most, if not all, provinces provide legal aid for divorces. 176
Two years after the decision in Boddie, the Supreme Court beat a
169. There was almost no debate of this potentially extremely important provision.
170. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
171. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
172. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
173. See, for example, Michaelman, supra, note 145.
174. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) [hereinafter Boddie].
175. Ibid. at 376.
176. In Ontario, see 0. Reg. 829/82 9GAA.
177. 409 U.S. 434 (1973) [hereinafter Kras].
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retreat in Re Kras.177 Mr. Kras was a life insurance agent for
Metropolitan life. He was fired by Metropolitan life when premiums
he had collected were stolen from his home and he was unable to pay
Metropolitan the $1000 he owed. He diligently sought work in New
York, but because of unfavourable references from Metropolitan, he
was unsuccessful.
Kras lived in a two and one-half room apartment with his wife and
two children, ages 5 years and 8 months, and his mother and his
mother's 6 year old daughter. The Kras family lived off $210 per
month family allowance and his mother's $156 per month public assis-
tance. Kras now sought $50 to declare bankruptcy.
Mr. Justice Blackmun gave the opinion of the six man majority:
"However unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a
debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by
negotiated agreement with his creditors. At other times the happy
passage of the applicable limitation period, or other acceptable
creditor arrangement, will provide the answer."
178
Perhaps realising the extreme feebleness of this approach, Mr. Justice
Blackmun pointed out that "if the filing fees were paid over six
months .... the required average weekly payment is $1.92. If the pay-
ment period is extended for the additional three months,.... the
average weekly payment is lowered to $1.28. This is a sum less than...
the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of
cigarettes". 179 Apart from the fact that there is no evidence that Kras
smoked or went to the movies, precisely the same reasoning could
have been used in Boddie.180 Although welfare claimants in Canada
are supposed to be able to get legal aid to declare bankruptcy, the
authorities that I have been able to find deny any such authority to
support such a right.181
Kras was soon followed in Ortwein v. Schwab182 upholding Oregon's
178. Ibid. at 445.
179. Ibid. at 449.
180. Supra, note 174.
181. See "Re Special Allowance for Bankruptcy Fees" (1973) 2 (no.1) Bull. Can. Wel.
Law 33; see also, LeBlanc v. City of Transcona, supra, note 25.
182. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
What's Your Favourite Right?
$25 appellate court filing fee for judicial review of welfare administra-
tive hearings.
In Warth v. Seldin,183 the Supreme Court used the law of standing to
block the rights of the poor. Different groups of plaintiffs in Warth
challenged the zoning practices of a city in New York claiming that
they had "the purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and
moderate income".184 The Supreme Court held that low income plain-
tiffs had no standing because the practices did not injure them in "any
concretely demonstrable way".185
It only remains to list briefly the remaining cases in which the
Supreme Court has failed to play the role of "constructive social
engineer" that so many had planned for it. In Dandridge v. Williams,186
Maryland placed a maximum of $250 under A.F.D.C. regardless of the
size of the family and regardless of need. It was argued, unsuccess-
fully, that this limitation discriminated unconstitutionally against large
poor families. Mr. Justice Stewart, giving the opinion of six members
of the Court,187 stated:
"... the constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess
state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipi-entes.,18
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,189 half the
financing of the Texas School system came from property taxes. The
grievers argued that the property tax system made for an unequal
school system, since the poor areas had a low tax base. The District
Court held that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that
"education" is a fundamental right Further, the Court held that it
could only uphold the system if the system showed a compelling state
interest The Supreme Court reversed.
183. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) [hereinafter Wartih].
184. bid. at 495.
185. Ibid. at 504.
186. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
187. Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan dissented.
188. Supra, note 186 at 487.
189. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Mr. Justice Powell, giving the opinion of five members of the court,
said that "recent studies have indicated that the poorest families are
not invariably clustered in the most impecunious districts".190 The
majority also refused to treat education as a fundamental right
"Education, of course", wrote Mr. Justice Powell, for the majority, "is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying that it is implicitly
so protected". 191
In Maher v. Roe,192 by a majority of 6-3, it was held that Connecticut
Welfare Department's decision not to use medicaid funds for abortion
was not unconstitutional. In Harris v. McRae,193 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Hyde amendment which withdrew federal
reimbursement for abortions performed on Medicaid. 194 The Court
characterized the right to have an abortion as a "liberty" rather than
as a fundamental right.
One final case that deserves mention is Wyman v. James.195 In that
case, the claimant, who was in receipt of A.F.D.C. benefits, had her
benefits cut off because she refused to let social workers, who wanted
to make a home visit, enter her apartment. The social workers did not
have a warrant A three judge district court held the purported search
illegal. The Supreme Court reversed this decision by 6-3. Mr. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that since there was no for-
cible entry or snooping and the purpose of the visit was rehabilitative,
there was no need for a warrant. If a genuine separation existed be-
tween rehabilitative social workers and social workers who are trying
to detect fraud, the decision would make some sense, but this is a dis-
tinction we resolutely refuse to make.196
190. Ibid. at 23.
191. Ibid. at 35.
192. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
193. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
194. A number of states have provided State funds for abortions. See the table in
Noy York 7imes (25 June 1989) 12.
195. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
196. The leading article remains that by Wickham, "Restricting Home Visits:
Toward Making the Life of Public Assistance Less Public" (1970) 118 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1188.
What's Your Favourite Right?
There is painfully little that we can learn from the United States
Supreme Court in this area. The principal lesson we should learn is
that courts are not equipped to deal with social problems, such as wel-
fare, education and the civil liberties of the poor.
IV. CONCLUSION
I propose to state my conclusions in point form.
1. Neither in Canada nor the United States has there been a major
breakthrough in the field of income maintenance. Goldberg v.
Kelly 197 may be the strongest candidate but its limitations are
severe. 198 The cases in the U.S. beginning with Griffin v. Illinois1 99
seem desirable until it is remembered that the indigent may be
under a financial obligation to pay for the services!
200
2. In Canada, the Silano201 case put welfare claimants in a worse
position.
3. In the Nova Scotia trilogy,202 J'incer,203 Bibi Alli, 20 King205 and
Bregman,2 6 the plaintiffs were no better off after expensive hear-
ings.
4. In Tetreault-Gadoury,0 7 the Federal Court of Appeal added, quite
unnecessarily, to the benefits paid to persons reaching the age of
65.
5. The Hebb20 8 case seems unlikely to prove of great importance,
197. Supra, note 146.
198. See O'Neil supra, notes 150-1 and Titmuss supra, note 152.
199. Supra, note 170.
200. In Fuller v. Oregon 417 U.S. 40 (1974) the Supreme Court upheld a State scheme
to recover expenses from a convicted defendant.
201. Supra, note 72.
202. Boudreau, supra, note 65 and Phillips, supra, note 66.
203. Supra, note 117.
204. Supra, note 120.
205. Supra, note 133.
206. Supra, note 114.
207. Supra, note 104.
208. Supra, note 84.
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since prosecutions are not normally brought in these circumstan-
ces.
6. The Schacter20 9 decision is still under appeal and it is too early to
offer any kind of final verdict It must also be remembered that
whatever benefits are given under the Schacter principle, these
benefits will have been given in the context of massive cuts in un-
employment insurance. These include the withdrawal of any pay-
ment from the exchequer, longer disqualification periods (an
increase from 6-12 weeks), longer qualifying periods, etc.
7. The decision in Symes21° benefits the wealthy at the expense of
those with moderate and low incomes.
But more serious than all these decisions is the fact that judicial ac-
tion makes it virtually impossible for welfare recipients to participate
in the judicial process. By way of contrast, when lawyers lobby
politicians this is an activity in which the disadvantaged can par-
ticipate. Ultimately, the exclusion of'the disadvantaged from the
process of demanding change is the most tragic feature of the Charter
lottery.
209. Supra, note 100.
210. Supra, note 135.
